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BEYOND THE BLAZE: STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING 
FOREST SERVICE FIRE SUPPRESSION POLICIES 
Aurora R. Janke* 
 
Abstract: Current Forest Service fire management policies restrict NEPA’s 
application to fire suppression actions and contribute to a lack of detailed 
information about the effectiveness and environmental impact of suppression 
efforts. Decisions by the U.S. District Court for the District of Montana in the 
Forest Service for Environmental Ethics v. U.S. Forest Service litigation suggest 
that NEPA review applies to commonly used fire suppression tactics and that 
the Forest Service should conduct this review before fires occur. Other recent 
federal district court decisions and congressional concern with current fire 
suppression efforts support the need for NEPA review in the fire suppression 
context. This comment explores this case law and analyzes Forest Service 
compliance with NEPA procedures in its fire suppression practices. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Keep this question in mind: What creates the greater 
impact, the fire suppression effort or the fire?”1 
Wildland fires2 are a part of the fabric and existence of the 
American West. Fire naturally occurs in most terrestrial 
ecosystems3 and can be an important tool for protecting, 
maintaining and enhancing natural resources.4 Wildland fire 
                                                
* JD Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, 2012. 
1. NAT’L WILDFIRE COORDINATING GRP., NFES 1831, RESOURCE ADVISOR’S GUIDE 
FOR WILDLAND FIRE, Appendix I Minimum Impact Suppression Tactics (MIST) 
Guidelines 3 (2004) [hereinafter RA Guide]. 
2. Wildland fires are non-structure fires occuring in wildland areas. See PHILIP N. 
OMI, FOREST FIRES 326 (2005). 
3. JAN L. BEYERS, ET AL., ROCKY MOUNTAIN RESEARCH STATION, WILDLAND FIRE IN 
ECOSYSTEMS: EFFECTS OF FIRE ON SOIL AND WATER vii (Daniel G. Neary, Kevin C. 
Ryan, Leonard F. DeBano eds., 2008). 
4. See DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR AND DEP’T OF AGRIC., NFES 2724, INTERAGENCY 
STANDARDS FOR FIRE AND FIRE AVIATION OPERATIONS 01-3 (2011) [hereinafter 
REDBOOK] (discussing agency policy for allowing fire to function in its natural 
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can also have catastrophic impacts on forests and people 
alike.5 Intense and fast-moving wildfires can threaten valued 
public lands and endanger communities.6 
Over the past twenty years, fire activity has increased in 
intensity.7 A recent U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report acknowledged the dramatic worsening of the 
nation’s wildfire problem, attributing the increase in fires to a 
number of factors, including drought, climate change, 
increased human development near wildlands and an 
accumulation of flammable vegetation resulting from over-
management of state and federal lands.8 Indeed, from 1999 to 
2008, the nation experienced 242 large wildfires (those 
exceeding 50,000 acres), compared to just 119 large fires in the 
last two decades of the twentieth-century.9 In 2002, several 
western states, including Colorado and Oregon, experienced 
their worst fire seasons in modern history.10 Such extreme 
fires can destroy homes, damage forests and threaten human 
lives.11 These risks to lives and property increase in the 
                                                
ecological role). 
5. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-158, WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT: 
IMPROVED PLANNING WILL HELP AGENCIES BETTER IDENTIFY FIRE-FIGHTING 
PREPAREDNESS NEEDS 5–6 (2002) [hereinafter GAO WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT 
2002] (discussing the 2000 fire season during which intense and catastrophic fires 
burned out-of-control and threatened communities. The intensity of the 2000 fire 
season led local, state and national policymakers to call for federal action to address 
the growing threat of catastrophic fires.). 
6. See Robert B Keiter, The Law of Fire: Reshaping Public Land Policy in An Era of 
Ecology and Litigation, 36 ENVTL. L. 301, 309 (2006) (discussing public reaction to 
1988 Yellowstone fires that burned over 1.5 million acres). 
7. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET AL., A NATIONAL COHESIVE WILDLAND FIRE 
MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 2 (2011) (discussing the rapid increase in fire severity and its 
impact on communities and the land) [hereinafter A NATIONAL COHESIVE WILDLAND 
FIRE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY]. 
8. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-423T, FOREST SERVICE: CONTINUED 
WORK NEEDED TO ADDRESS PERSISTENT MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 2 (2011) 
[hereinafter GAO FOREST SERVICE 2011] (discussing recent improvements in fire 
management, while highlighting ongoing challenges in Forest Service wildlfire 
management, data collection, and financial and performance accountability). 
9. See FIRE EXEC. COUNCIL ET AL., QUADRENNIAL FIRE REVIEW 8 (2009) (The QFR is 
a strategic management document that reviews the joint efforts by five federal natural 
resource management agencies operating under the Departments of the Interior and 
Agriculture: The Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, National Park Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The QFR aims to 
create a unified strategic vision for fire management.). 
10. See Keiter, supra note 6, at 310–311. 
11. GAO FOREST SERVICE 2011, supra note 8, at 2. 
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Wildland Urban Interface, residential areas adjacent to 
undeveloped wildlands,12 especially as more people move to 
these areas.13 Additionally, more intense fires typically require 
more expensive fire suppression efforts, costing federal 
agencies billions of dollars.14 
The Forest Service, a land and resource management agency 
within the Department of Agriculture, is a leading federal 
agency in forest fire management.15  Over the last century, the 
Forest Service’s approach to fire suppression fluctuated based 
on public concern for human safety and property and on 
scientific understanding of fire’s role in nature. The Forest 
Service continues to develop its fire policy based on these 
concerns but, as fire danger increases, maintaining a balance 
between human safety and ecological health becomes more 
difficult. To achieve this balance, the Forest Service must 
determine the best fire management approach to reduce the 
ecological, human and economic threats that extreme fires 
present. 
In the past decade, various environmental groups sued the 
Forest Service over the agency’s fire prevention and post-fire 
restoration activities alleging violations of the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Forest 
Management Act (NFMA).16 These cases typically challenged 
either the Forest Service’s decision to reduce potential fire 
danger through thinning projects17 or the agency’s decision to 
contract with logging companies to “salvage” (harvest) burned 
timber after a fire occurs.18 A series of recent cases, Forest 
                                                
12. See FIRE EXEC. COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 9, at iii (explaining regional shifts in 
population that increased development and residential areas near public lands). 
13. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., 2001 REVIEW OF 1995 FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE 
MANAGEMENT POLICY 3 (2001) (discussing the unique problems presented by the 
Wildland Urban Interface, including landowner expectations of urban emergency 
services for wildland fire threats). 
14. See id. at 2 (highlighting increases in Forest Service spending in relation to 
increased fire danger). 
15. GAO WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT 2002, supra note 5, at 6. 
16. See, e.g., League of Wilderness Defenders – Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project 
v. Forsgren, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1062 (D. Or. 2002) (challenging Forest Service 
award of salvage logging contract); League of Wilderness Defenders v. Allen, 615 F.3d 
1122 (9th Cir. 2010) (challenging Forest Service fire reduction thinning projects for 
failure to comply with NFMA and NEPA). 
17. See Allen, 615 F.3d 1122. 
18. See Forsgren, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1058. 
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Service Employees for Environmental Ethics (FSEEE)19 v. U.S. 
Forest Service I, II, and III, 20 shifted this fire management 
discussion to focus on the Forest Service’s approach to fighting 
fire, instead of focusing on the agency’s pre- and post-fire 
activities. Specifically, the cases challenged the Forest 
Service’s use of long-term fire retardant21 without adequately 
analyzing its potential environmental impact.22 These cases 
represent a novel challenge to the Forest Service’s fire 
management and highlight the tension between the Forest 
Service’s responsibility to protect human health and property23 
and its duty to care for the land.24 In shifting the discussion to 
fire suppression, FSEEE I, II, and III raise the question of 
whether the Forest Service adequately considers the 
environmental impacts of all its suppression tactics. 
Existing literature on the legal and policy framework of 
federal fire management discusses the policy tension between 
                                                
19. Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics is a national organization 
comprised of present and former Forest Service employees and concerned citizens 
working to hold the Forest Service accountable for responsible land stewardship. For 
more information see http://www.fseee.org/. 
20. See Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE I), 397 
F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Mont. 2005); Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. 
Forest Serv. (FSEEE II), 530 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (D. Mont. 2008) (finding a contempt 
hearing warranted when the Forest Service failed to comply with the 2005 Decision 
and Order); Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE III), 
726 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (D. Mont. 2010). These cases also address several Endangered 
Species Act (ESA) issues that are not the focus of this comment, although the ESA 
may provide another avenue for increasing accountability in fire suppression. 
21. Long-term fire retardants are made of fertilizer salts which affect the way fuels 
burn. These fire retardants are generally applied to fuels via large air tankers, single 
engine airtankers, or helicopter buckets. See REDBOOK, supra note 4, at 12-1. The 
Forest Service lists six types of long-term fire retardant on its Wildland Fire Chemical 
Systems website. Each product has a different chemical make-up. For example, Phos-
Chek 259-F contains a diammonium phosphate base, a fugitive coloring agent, a low 
concentration of gum thickeners, and bactericide and corrosion inhibitors. This long-
term retardant is recommended for helicopter use because it is the only long-term 
retardant that will not corrode magnesium. See USDA Forest Service, Phos-Check 259-
F, Product Information, http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/fire/wfcs/products/index.htm (last 
visited October 18, 2011). 
22. See FSEEE I, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1244, 1246 (In 2003, the Forest Service and 
other federal and state land management agencies, used over 23 million gallons of 
retardant in their fire suppression activities). 
23. A NATIONAL COHESIVE WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY supra note 7, at 
7 (discussing that every fire land management organization must work to protect lives, 
property and resources). 
24. The Forest Service Mission is “caring for the land and serving the people.” For 
more information see http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/mission.shtml. 
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managing forests for ecological health and protecting 
communities. In this literature, scholars call attention to the 
need for a comprehensive legal structure that recognizes fire’s 
role as a resource management tool.  Robert Keiter25 and Sara 
Jensen26 argue that the existing fire management framework 
is not unworkably flawed, but it is in need of changes including 
better guidance, consistency and incentives for implementing 
sound fire management practices.27 While these articles 
explore existing fire management laws and policies generally, 
this comment focuses on a specific, crucial issue of fire 
management—the Forest Service’s use of fire suppression 
tactics—highlighting the need for more comprehensive 
environmental analysis to inform fire suppression decisions. 
Through an examination of recent cases challenging Forest 
Service fire management, this comment will demonstrate the 
need for the Forest Service to conduct detailed planning and 
environmental analysis before engaging in fire suppression 
activities. Part I describes the history of Forest Service fire 
management and summarizes current laws and policies 
governing fire management. Part II explores the 
environmental and economic costs of fire suppression. Part III 
discusses the role of NEPA in the Forest Service’s land 
management plans and fire management programs. Part IV 
considers the recent Forest Service Employees for 
Environmental Ethics v. U.S. Forest Service28 decisions within 
the broader context of litigation challenging forest service fire 
management practices. Finally, Part V makes 
recommendations for increasing Forest Service environmental 
accountability and consistency in its fire management 
practices. 
                                                
25. Keiter, supra note 5. Robert Keiter serves as the Wallace Stegner Professor of 
Law and Director of the Wallace Stegner Center for Land, Resources and the 
Environment at the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law. 
26. Sara Elizabeth Jensen, Policy Tools for Wildland Fire Management: Principles, 
Incentives, and Conflicts, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 959, 999–1001 (2006). Sara E. Jensen 
served as Assistant Staff Scientist at the University of Arizona’s Institute for the 
Study of Planet Earth. 
27. See generally Keiter, supra note 6, at 304–322; Jensen, supra note 26, at 999–
1001. 
28. Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE III), 726 F. 
Supp. 2d 1195, 1195 (D. Mont. 2010). 
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II. UNDERSTANDING FOREST SERVICE FIRE 
MANAGEMENT 
The Forest Service controls 192 million acres of America’s 
public lands29 and is charged with protecting forests and 
communities from catastrophic wildfires.30 In addition to fire 
management, the Forest Service must manage its lands to 
support a variety of interests and activities, including 
protecting wilderness, watersheds and wildlife; facilitating 
rangeland use and timber sales; and promoting recreational 
use.31 The Forest Service’s duty to manage and protect forests, 
coupled with the human, property and ecological risks of 
wildfires, makes fire management and suppression complex 
and challenging.32 Understanding the multifaceted process of 
fire management requires a review of the Forest Service’s fire 
management history, the environmental laws that influence 
fire policy and the economic and environmental impact of fire 
and fire suppression. 
A.  Developing Forest Service Fire Management Policy33 
Forest Service fire management has an extensive history in 
the United States, especially in the West. Through the 1891 
Forest Reserve Act and the 1897 Organic Act, Congress34 
established national forests and created a plan for their 
management.35 Specifically, the Forest Reserve Act of 1891 
created forest reserves out of public domain lands and the 
Organic Act created management standards for these lands, 
which required the government to improve forest health and 
                                                
29. History, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, http://www.fs.fed.us/aboutus/history/ (last visited 
Sept. 21, 2011). 
30. GAO WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT 2002, supra note 5, at 6. 
31. GAO FOREST SERVICE 2011, supra note 8, at 2. 
32. See id. at 9 (discussing the “daunting challenge” of protecting lives, property, and 
federal resources from fire); see also Jensen, supra note 26, at 960–961. 
33. For a more comprehensive history of Forest Service fire policy see Keiter, supra 
note 6, at 304–322. 
34. See 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2006); Forest Service at a Glance, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, 
http://www.fs.fed.us/plan/par/2003/final/html/fs_glance/founding_legislation.shtml 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2011). 
35. See Aaron Shapiro, Contextual History of the Forest Service Mission and Motto 1–
2, http://www.fs.fed.us/fstoday/080808/LOOKING_BACK_Mission.pdf (last visited Feb. 
27, 2011). 
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provide timber and water resources.36 In 1905, Congress 
officially created the United States Forest Service within the 
Department of Agriculture to manage the nation’s forest 
reserves.37 In 1910, the West, including these newly created 
Forest Service lands, experienced a catastrophic fire season 
during which wildfires ravaged much of Idaho and Montana, 
claiming eighty-five lives and burning over three million 
acres.38 The 1910 fires shaped Forest Service fire policy. In an 
attempt to ward off the recurrence of such widespread 
calamity, the Forest Service implemented a blanket fire 
suppression policy,39 putting out small remote fires based on 
fears these fires could spread out of control and threaten 
surrounding communities.40 Continual fire suppression stifled 
natural fire regimes41 and threatened the ecological resilience 
of the landscape by allowing the build-up of flammable 
vegetation (fuels) that can cause more extreme and 
unmanageable fires.42 
During the 1960s, in response to changing public attitudes 
about preserving wilderness areas, the Forest Service 
reevaluated its fire policies and began allowing some natural 
fires to promote healthy forest and wildlife management.43 
However, these practices were criticized in the wake of the 
                                                
36. See id. 
37. U.S. Forest Service History: Agency Organization, THE FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY 
(Mar. 25, 2010), http://www.foresthistory.org/ASPNET/Policy/Agency_Organization/ind 
ex.aspx. 
38. See Keiter, supra note 6, at 305–306. 
39. See id. at 306; see also William B. Greeley, “Piute Forestry” for the Fallacy of 
Light Burning, 1920, reprinted in FOREST HISTORY TODAY (Spring 1999), available at 
http://www.foresthistory.org/Publications/FHT/FHTSpring1999/PiuteForestry.pdf 
(emphasizing the need to “put an end to the destruction of forests by fire” and 
condemning those who argue for “light” or prescribed burning as a fire prevention 
tool). 
40. See Keiter, supra note 6, at 306–307 (discussing the Forest Service’s adoption of 
a blanket suppression policy in the wake of the 1910 fires which burned over three 
million acres and claimed eighty-five lives); see also id. at 365–366. 
41. The term “natural fire regime” classifies the “role fire would play across a 
landscape in the absence of modern human mechanical intervention but including the 
influence of aboriginal burning.” Classes of fire regimes are differentiated by the 
number of years between fires and the severity of the fire.  David C. Powell, 
Estimating Crown Fire Susceptibility for Project Planning, 70 FIRE MANAGEMENT 
TODAY No. 3 9 (2010). 
42. See Keiter, supra note 6, at 309. 
43. See id. at 308. 
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1988 Yellowstone fires, which burned more than 1.5 million 
acres of national park and national forest lands.44 The 
Yellowstone fires initiated another shift in Forest Service 
policy and the Forest Service suspended its use of natural 
fires, later allowing the use of prescribed fire policies only after 
extensive fire management planning.45 
In 1994, powerful fires burned over five million acres in the 
West and claimed thirty-four lives.46 This tragic summer forced 
the Forest Service to once again reexamine its fire 
management policies.47 The following year, an interagency 
team released the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire Management 
Report, which recognized the need to reintroduce fire in forest 
ecosystems and encouraged planning systems that 
incorporated the best available science on forest health and 
fire prevention.48 The Forest Service began reintroducing 
natural fire cycles into ecosystems in an attempt to counteract 
the fuels buildup created by continual suppression of fire.49 To 
reintroduce these natural fire cycles, the Forest Service 
implemented tools such as fire use, allowing fires to burn for 
ecological benefits, and fuels reductions activities, such as 
thinning forests and conducting prescribed burns to thin 
underbrush as a means of preventing fire and fostering forest 
health.50  In 2001, after another severe fire season an 
interagency team updated the 1995 Report.51 The 2001 Review 
of the 1995 Federal Willand Fire Management Report placed 
emphasis on science and forest health,52 drawing attention to 
one of the most difficult and hotly contested debates in fire 
management: whether fire is a threat or a tool to create 
                                                
44. Id. at 309. 
45. See id. 
46. See id. at 309–310. 
47. See id. 
48. See id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., 2001 REVIEW OF 1995 
FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY 1–3 (2001) available at 
http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/ppm/fpc/archives/fire_policy/history/index.htm. 
49. See Keiter, supra note 6, at 310. 
50. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., supra note 48, at 2 (discussing the need 
to reintegrate fire as an essential ecosystem process). 
51. See id. at 3–4. 
52. See id. at 2 (discussing the need to accept wildland fire as an essential ecosystem 
process). 
9
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healthier forests.53 
Forest Service fire suppression policy faces a complex 
dilemma: how can the agency actively engage in fire 
suppression to protect forests and communities while 
reintroducing fire in its natural role in the ecosystem?54 This 
conflict is evident in Forest Service and interagency reports on 
fire policy. For example, a recent interagency55 report on fire 
suppression preparedness describes fire suppression resources, 
such as bulldozers and handcrews, as part of the “militia” that 
works to suppress fire56 while at the same time highlighting 
the need to restore fire-adapted ecosystems.57 Similarly, the 
Interagency Guidance for Implementation of Federal Wildland 
Fire Management Policy indicates that fire is “a critical 
natural process” that should be integrated into fire 
management plans, but emphasizes the primary role of 
community safety in decisionmaking.58 These agency 
documents indicate the Forest Service’s attempt to suppress 
fires to protect human safety while using fire as a tool to 
improve ecological health. As fires increase in intensity and 
size, the Forest Service will have to determine how to most 
effectively account for both safety and ecological needs. 
Several laws regulating Forest Service fire management 
serve as a foundation for these Forest Service policy 
documents, including NEPA,59 the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA) of 1973,60 the NFMA,61 the Healthy Forests Restoration 
                                                
53. See Jensen, supra note 26, at 959, 962; see also Lauren Wishnie, Fire and 
Federalism, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1006, 1008–1009 (2008) (discussing the wide range 
of issues implicated by fire management, including protecting ecological and property 
values). 
54. See Keiter, supra note 6, at 315. 
55. This guidance is developed by several firefighting agencies including the 
Department of Agriculture and the Department of Interior. 
56. See FIRE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL ET AL., supra note 9, at 31 (explaining the 
increasing costs of fire suppression due to dramatic weather conditions, hazardous 
fuels build up and urban encroachment in forested areas). 
57. See id. at 4. 
58. See U.S. FOREST SERVICE ET AL., GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL 
WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY 6, 8 (2009) [hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR 
IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT]. 
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h (2006). 
60. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1599 (2006). 
61. Id. §§ 472a, 521b, 1600, 1611–1614 (amending Forest and Rangeland Renewable 
Resources Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476). 
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Act (HFRA) of 2003 and the Federal Land Assistance, 
Management, and Enhancement (FLAME) Act of 2009.62 
B. The Laws and Policies of Fire Management 
Forest Service fire management functions under a network 
of environmental laws and agency policies. 63 These laws and 
policies govern both the general approach to fire management 
and the decisions made during specific instances of fire 
suppression. First, NEPA requires all agencies to analyze the 
environmental impact of a proposed action. Second, the ESA 
restricts agency actions that harm listed species. Third, the 
NFMA governs the Forest Service’s general land management 
activities. Fourth, the HFRA attempts to reduce fire danger 
through fuels reduction projects. Fifth, as discussed in the next 
section on the financial impacts of fire management, the 
FLAME Act regulates funding and requires fire management 
agencies to create a cohesive wildfire management strategy. In 
addition to these laws, Forest Service and interagency fire 
management policies play an important role in fire 
management. 
i.  The National Environmental Policy Act 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) governs all 
federal agency actions affecting the environment, requiring 
agencies to follow certain procedures before taking action that 
might significantly impact the environment.64 The goal of 
NEPA’s procedural mandate is to “foster better decision-
making” and “facilitate informed public participation for 
actions affecting humans and nature.”65 Several Supreme 
Court decisions66 narrowly construe the law’s mandate and, 
                                                
62. 17 U.S.C. §§ 6501 et. seq. (2006); see also Keiter, supra note 6, at 313. 
63. See Keiter, supra note 6, at 304. 
64. See Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
65. See League of Wilderness Defenders–Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. 
Forsgren, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1063 (D. Or. 2002). 
66. See e.g. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 406 (1976) (interpreting the 
“procedural duties” imposed by NEPA and limiting court authority to force agency 
action outside of the clear statutory procedures); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 
Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (recognizing NEPA has 
some substantive elements, but emphasizing that the Act’s mandate is “essentially 
procedural” and that courts may only set aside agency decisions based on substantial 
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thus, NEPA’s requirements are only procedural, not 
substantive, in nature.67 
Nevertheless, NEPA mandates that federal agencies 
evaluate, “to the fullest extent possible,”68 the environmental 
impact of a proposed “major federal action.”69 Major federal 
actions are those actions “potentially subject to Federal control 
and responsibility” that may have a major effect.70 If the major 
federal action will significantly affect the quality of the human 
environment, agencies must issue a detailed Environmental 
Impact Statement (EIS).71 The EIS discusses the 
environmental impact, any adverse environmental effects, 
alternatives to the proposed action, and the short and long-
term benefits of the project.72 By requiring this environmental 
analysis before an agency takes action, NEPA “ensures that 
important effects will not be overlooked or underestimated 
only to be discovered after resources have been committed or 
the die otherwise cast.”73 Thus, an EIS grants notice of the 
anticipated consequences of an action and allows for, but does 
not require, implementation of alternative or corrective 
measures.74 
In the alternative, the Council of Environmental Quality 
(CEQ), which issues regulations interpreting NEPA, allows 
agencies to prepare an Environmental Analysis (EA) when the 
proposed action does not clearly require an EIS and is not 
                                                
procedural violations). 
67. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 810 (Hornbook Series, West 
Publishing 2d ed. 1994). 
68. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006). 
69. Id. § 4332(2)(C) (requiring federal agencies to “include in every recommendation 
or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly 
affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the 
responsible official on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any 
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be 
implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between 
local short-term uses of man’s environment and the maintenance and enhancement of 
long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of 
resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.”). 
70. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (2010). 
71. Id.; see also Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 757 (2004). 
72. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i)-(v). 
73. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council et al., 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) 
(interpreting §§ 101 and 102 of NEPA). 
74. Id. at 350. 
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categorically excluded from NEPA requirements.75 The EA is a 
brief document that analyzes whether an EIS is appropriate or 
whether the proposed action will have no significant impact, 
which is explained in a “finding of no significant impact” 
(FONSI) document.76 In some cases, agency regulations 
categorically exclude certain agency actions from NEPA 
procedures.77 A categorical exclusion applies to “actions which 
do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on 
the human environment and which have been found to have no 
such effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency . . . and 
for which, therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor 
an environmental impact statement is required.”78 In other 
words, NEPA regulations allow agency actions with minimal 
environmental effect to bypass the EA and EIS process.79 
Additionally, some emergency situations receive temporary 
exemption from NEPA’s procedural mandate.80 In an 
emergency, agencies may consult with the CEQ for an 
alternative compliance method that allows the agency to take 
the emergency action.81 In the fire context, Forest Service 
NEPA regulations allow “responsible officials” to determine 
whether an emergency exists that requires urgent action 
before NEPA review can be conducted.82 When such an 
emergency event occurs, Forest Service officials may take 
necessary action to prevent harm to “life, property, or 
important natural or cultural resources,” but the official 
should also account for the likely environmental consequences 
of the emergency action and mitigate the impact as 
practicable.83 These regulations attempt to balance the nature 
                                                
75. See Dep’t of Transportation, 541 U.S at 757–758 (interpreting 40 C.F.R. §§ 
1504.1 (a)–(b) (2003)). 
76. Id. (interpreting 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13 (2003)). 
77. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1147 (2009) (discussing 
Forest Service regulations that categorically excluded certain fire-rehabilitation 
activities from EA or EIS procedures). 
78. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010) (emphasis added). 
79. See California ex. rel. Lockyer v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 575 F.3d 999, 1012–13 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (describing the Forest Service’s adoption in its Forest Service Handbook of a 
variety of categorical exclusions from environmental analysis). 
80. See CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11 (2010) (discussing procedures for 
emergency situations). 
81. See id. 
82. See 36 C.F.R. § 220.4(b) (2011). 
83. Id. § 220.4(b)(1). 
13
Janke: Beyond the Blaze: Strategies for Improving Forest Service Fire Su
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011
2011] BEYOND THE BLAZE 323 
 
and threat of the emergency with the probable environmental 
consequences, but fall short of requiring a full NEPA review. 
ii. Endangered Species Act 
In addition to NEPA, the ESA requires agencies to consult 
with either the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the 
National Ocean and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries 
Service84 (NOAA Fisheries) before taking action to avoid 
jeopardizing or harming endangered or threatened species or 
destroying critical habitat for these species.85 If formal 
consultation occurs, the FWS or the NOAA Fisheries must 
prepare a biological opinion analyzing the likeliness of the 
jeopardy to the species or critical habitat and develop 
reasonable and prudent alternatives to the proposed action 
where necessary.86 As an exception to the ban on harming 
listed species, FWS or NOAA Fisheries may issue an incidental 
take statement that allows an agency to “take” or harm a listed 
species if the harm is incidental to an otherwise lawful agency 
action.87 
Because of this emergency exception to consultation, the 
Forest Service has sometimes applied ESA retroactively to its 
fire suppression activities. For example, when using aerial fire 
retardant as a fire suppression tool, the Forest Service first 
dropped the retardant and then later attempted to comply with 
the ESA.88 At least one federal court held that this post-
emergency consultation did not excuse the Forest Service’s 
failure to consult prior to retardant use when the Forest 
Service knew waterway drops could harm listed species and 
post-emergency ESA consultation would be the only forum for 
evaluating the use of retardant.89 
                                                
84. See Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE I), 397 
F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1255 (D. Mont. 2005) (explaining that ESA requires an agency to 
engage in formal consultation with the FWS or NMFS if the initial agency determines 
the proposed action may adversely affect a listed species). 
85. See 16 USC § 1536(a)(2) (2010). 
86. See Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE III), 
726 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1219 (D. Mont. 2010); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2010). 
87. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. 
88. See FSEEE I, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1256–1257. 
89. Id. (stating that “[t]he unique temporal considerations arising from USFS’s 
procedures for the use of fire retardant mean that . . . the agency can evade ESA 
compliance . . .”). 
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iii. National Forest Management Act of 1976 
The NFMA recognizes the complex challenge of managing 
the country’s renewable resources.90 The NFMA requires the 
Forest Service to be a leader in promoting natural resource 
conservation that will serve future generations91 and creates a 
tiered management system on a national, regional, and local 
level.92 Under the NFMA, the Forest Service is responsible for 
managing environmental and economic resources related to 
recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and fish.93 To 
facilitate better leadership on the national level, the NFMA 
requires the Forest Service to promulgate national regulations 
for the development of regional and local land management 
plans.94 Regional Land and Resource Management Plans 
(LRMPs) guide and limit actions at the regional level, but they 
do not plan for any specific actions.95 The NFMA requires other 
site-specific LRMPs that govern on-the-ground activities that 
must comply with both the national and regional plans.96 
These site-specific plans govern all subsequent agency actions 
in that area.97 Under the NFMA, agency officials must write 
these national, regional and local plans to facilitate public 
participation and to consider “environmental aspects” of 
managing renewable resources.98 The NFMA highlights the 
importance of balancing the use of renewable resources with 
an understanding of the environmental impacts of such use.99 
                                                
90. 16 U.S.C. § 1600(1) (2006) (“the management of the Nation’s renewable resources 
is highly complex and the uses, demand for, and supply of the various resources are 
subject to change over time”). 
91. Id. § 1600(6). 
92. See Ohio Forestry Ass’n. Inc. v. Sierra Club, et al., 523 U.S. 726, 728–729 (1998); 
see also Citizens for Better Forestry v. US  Dep’t of Agric. (Citizens I), 341 F.3d 961, 
965 (9th Cir. 2003). 
93. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(A). 
94. See Citizens I, 341 F.3d at 965–67 (discussing the three tiered regulatory system 
under NFMA that requires uniform national regulations of the forest management 
system to govern development and revision of regional and local plans); see also 16 
U.S.C. § 1604(g). 
95. Citizens I, 341 F.3d at 966. 
96. Id. 
97. League of Wilderness Defenders v. Allen, 615 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(interpreting § 1604(a) and § 1604(i)). 
98. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(d), (g)(1), (g)(3)(A). 
99. See id. § 1600(1)–(4). 
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The NFMA does not specifically cover fire management, but 
National Forest personnel develop fire management plans for 
individual national forests in conformance with the site-
specific LRMPs.100 The 1995 Federal Willand Fire 
Management Report requires the Forest Service to identify 
and integrate wildfire management and related activities in a 
Fire Management Plan (FMP) for each national forest.101 
FMPs are strategic documents required in all geographic areas 
that have “burnable vegetation” 102 and aid fire personnel in 
making “informed decisions on the management of wildland 
fires.”103 When a wildfire occurs, FMPs and LRMPs provide 
guidance to Forest Service officials as to whether or not they 
will base suppression activities solely on protection objectives 
or on both resource and protection objectives.104 The Forest 
Service manages some fires for resource benefits to allow fire 
to serve its natural ecological purpose based on predetermined 
resource management objectives and in predefined areas.105  If 
an area does not have an approved FMP, the fire must be 
suppressed.106 
The Forest Service emphasizes that these plans address 
environmental laws and regulations, but no longer requires 
                                                
100. See Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE I), 
397 F. Supp. 2d 1241,1245 (D. Mont. 2005). 
101. See GAO WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT 2002, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that 
the 1995 policy “required that each burnable acre of federal land be covered by a fire 
management plan”); see also GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL FIRE 
POLICY, supra note 58, at 16 (defining a Fire Management Plan as “a plan that 
identifies and integrates all wildland fire within the context of approved land/resource 
management plans.  It defines a program to manage wildland fires (wildfire and 
prescribed fire). The plan is supplemented by operational plans, including but not 
limited to preparedness plans, preplanned dispatch plans, prescribed fire burn plans 
and prevention plans.  Fire Management Plan’s assure that wildland fire management 
goals and components are coordinated.”). 
102. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL, supra note 48, at 12, 26–27 (discussing the 
need for all land management agencies to develop Fire Management Plans). 
103. NATIONAL WILDFIRE COORDINATING GROUP, INTERAGENCY FIRE MANAGEMENT 
PLAN TEMPLATE 1 (2009), available at www.nwcg.gov/branches/ppm/ifpc/fmp/ifmp-
template.pdf. 
104. See GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL FIRE POLICY, supra note 58, 
at app. B at 18. 
105. USDA FOREST SERVICE SEQUOIA NATIONAL FOREST, Fire Use for Resource 
Benefits, http://www.fs.fed.us/r5/sequoia/fire/wildland_fire_use/wfu_resource_benefit. 
html (last visited Oct. 15, 2011). 
106. NATIONAL WILDFIRE COORDINATING GROUP, supra note 103, at 1. 
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NEPA compliance for FMPs.107 While FMPs must consider the 
best available science and incorporate “environmental quality 
considerations,”108 the Forest Service does not interpret FMPs 
as decisional documents.109 As a result, FMPs are not 
considered “major federal action”110 under NEPA and do not 
trigger environmental review procedures.111 However, the 2001 
Review and Update of the 1995 Federal Wildland Fire 
Management Policy notes that inconsistent and incomplete 
guidance for addressing environmental impacts hinders 
adequate FMP preparation.112 Despite inconsistent 
implementation and lack of NEPA review, FMPs serve as the 
basis for making decisions about whether and when to 
suppress fires.113 
iv. Healthy Forests Initiative and Healthy Forests Restoration 
Act of 2003 
In 2002, the Bush Administration launched the Healthy 
Forests Initiative (HFI) and the following year Congress 
passed the HFRA. Both the HFI and HFRA attempt to address 
increasing fire danger by making it easier to remove highly 
flammable vegetation buildup and other hazardous fuels.114 
                                                
107. See Keiter, supra note 6, at 368–69 (“at the planning level, the Forest Service’s 
revised NFMA rules have eliminated NEPA compliance from planning level decisions . 
. . effectively insulating most fire-related and other forest planning decisions from 
judicial review.”). 
108. GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT 
POLICY, supra note 58, at 9. 
109. See Keiter, supra note 6, at 368–69; but see People of California v. U.S. Forest 
Serv., No. C 04-02588 CRB, 2005 WL 1630020, at 11 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 11, 2005) (finding 
that the Forest Service was required to conduct an environmental review on a Fire 
Management Plan when the fire plan set forth concrete polices that constituted a 
major federal action). 
110. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006) (discussing the procedures required for “major 
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment”). 
111. WILDLAND FIRE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, INTERAGENCY STRATEGY FOR THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF FEDERAL WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT POLICY 49 (Jun. 20, 
2003) available at http://www.nwcg.gov/branches/ppm/fpc/archives/fire_policy/pdf/ 
strategy.pdf (discussing fire management plans and stating that an FMP “does not 
prescribe decisions; rather it provides the operational parameters a fire manager 
needs to implement the LRMP and other NEPA decisions). 
112. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL, supra note 48, at 12. 
113. See id. 
114. Forest Service Technology & Development Program, The Healthy Forests 
Initiative and Healthy Forests Restoration Act Interim Field Guide (Aug. 9, 2011), 
http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/hfi/field-guide/web/page02.php#initiative. 
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The Act and the Initiative, however, diminished the 
environmental protections NEPA and the ESA provided.115 The 
HFI directed the Department of Agriculture, along with the 
Department of the Interior and the CEQ, to “improve 
regulatory processes to ensure more timely decisions, greater 
efficiency, and better results in reducing the risk of 
catastrophic wildfires by restoring forest health.”116 
In accordance with the HFI, the Departments of the 
Interior, Agriculture and Commerce altered their ESA 
consultation regulations to establish alternative informal 
consultation for certain actions unlikely to have an adverse 
effect on listed species or critical habitat.117 Similarly, HFRA 
set forth categorical exclusions118 from NEPA for some fire-
prevention fuel treatment projects, including prescribed fire 
and mechanical thinning, and for post-fire rehabilitation 
projects, including tree planting and timber salvaging.119 While 
the HFI and HFRA address many issues of fire prevention and 
post-fire rehabilitation, they offer less direction on fire 
suppression decisions. Because this comment focuses on Forest 
Service fire suppression activities, the HFI and HFRA are less 
helpful to this analysis, but are still important for 
understanding the larger regulatory scheme governing Forest 
Service fire management. 
v. Additional Forest Service Guidance, Policies and Manuals 
Decisions made during fire suppression must also comport 
with national suppression principles and practices established 
through a series of guides, policies and manuals issued at the 
                                                
115. See Keiter, supra note 6, at 370. 
116. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HEALTHY FORESTS: AN INITIATIVE FOR WILDFIRE 
PREVENTION AND STRONGER COMMUNITIES Executive Summary (2002), available at 
www.fs.fed.us/projects/.../HealthyForests_Pres_Policy%20A6_v2.pdf. 
117. See id. at 4. 
118.  
A categorical exclusion is ‘a category of actions which do not individually or 
cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment and which have 
been found to have no such effect in procedures adopted by a Federal agency . . . 
and for which, therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an 
environmental impact statement is required.’  
Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 632 F. Supp. 2d 968 (Citizens III) 
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4). 
119. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET. AL., FS-799 THE HEALTHY FORESTS INITIATIVE AND 
HEALTHY FORESTS RESTORATION ACT INTERIM FIELD GUIDE 6 (2004). 
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federal level.120 The most important of these documents are A 
National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy,121 the 
Forest Service Manual on fire management and the 2001 
Review of the 1995 Federal Wildland Management Policy.122  
While these documents are likely not legally binding,123 they 
provide insight into the Forest Service’s planning process. 
The National Cohesive Wildland Fire Management Strategy 
of 2011, discussed infra Part II, sets forth a national vision for 
present and future fire management.124 The Forest Service 
Manual governs all aspects of Forest Service activity, including 
fire management,125 and outlines wildland fire suppression and 
planning operations.126 The 2001 Review of the 1995 Federal 
Wildland Fire Management Policy articulates the key 
components of Federal Wildland Fire Management Policy, 
emphasizes the need to reintroduce fire into forests and 
promotes the evaluation and incorporation of environmental 
quality considerations and best science into decision-making 
surrounding fire suppression and prevention activities.127 
II. FINANCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF 
FIRE 
The economic and environmental costs of suppressing forest 
fires also inform fire policy.128 Each year, fire suppression 
                                                
120. See Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE I), 
397 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1244 (D. Mont. 2005) (discussing the national guidelines and 
policies for fire management). 
121. A NATIONAL COHESIVE WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 7, 
at 2. 
122. FSEEE I, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1244. 
123. Western Radio Servs. Co., Inc., v. Espy, 79 F.3d 896, 901 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(stating that the Forest Service Manual does not have independent force of law 
because it is not promulgated in accordance with APA procedures such as notice and 
comment, nor is the Manual published in the Federal Register). 
124. See id. 
125. See FSEEE I, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1244 (explaining that the Forest Service 
Manual 5100 provides overall guidance on fire management). 
126. See generally U.S. FOREST SERVICE, FOREST SERVICE MANUAL 5130: FIRE 
SUPPRESSION (2004). 
127. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., supra note 48, at 1–3, 7–8. 
128. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. AND U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, THE FEDERAL LAND 
ASSISTANCE, MANAGEMENT, AND ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2009 – REPORT TO CONGRESS 
25 (March 2011) (discussing the different costs associated with wildfire management, 
including establishing healthier ecosystems through reintroducing fire and reducing 
hazardous fuels). 
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activities require a significant amount of federal funding, 
triggering congressional efforts to cut these costs. 
Understanding the actual costs of fire suppression also 
requires analysis of the environmental consequences of certain 
suppression tactics and the impact of the fire itself. 
 
A. The Federal Government Spends Millions of Dollars on 
Forest Service Fire Suppression Efforts 
Fire suppression requires significant federal funding. From 
2004 to 2008, federal public lands experienced fifty wildfires 
that each cost at least ten million dollars.129 Ninety-five 
percent of these fires fell under the Forest Service’s 
jurisdiction.130 These expensive fires stressed federal coffers 
and required the federal government to transfer significant 
funds from the annual budgets of other Forest Service and 
Department of Interior programs to cover costs.131 Given the 
anticipated increase in extreme weather, these costs are likely 
to increase.132 The GAO recently reported that the Forest 
Service’s fire-related funding increased to a nearly $2.3 billion 
average over the past five years, up from just over $700 million 
in 1999.133 
In 2009, Congress addressed the increasing cost of 
suppressing wildfires by passing the FLAME Act.134 FLAME 
requires the Departments of Agriculture and Interior to create 
a “. . .cohesive wildfire management strategy” based on 
recommendations from the Government Accountability 
Office.135 These recommendations, based on a 2007 GAO 
                                                
129. See FIRE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 1, 3 (discussing the increasing 
costs of fire suppression due to dramatic weather conditions, hazardous fuels build-up 
and urban encroachment in forested areas as well as the expense of fires for years 
2004–2008). 
130. See id. at 3. 
131. Id. at 15 (stating that more the federal government had to transfer more than 
three billion dollars was transferred from other Department of the Interior and Forest 
Service program accounts to support fire suppression). 
132. Id. at 6 (discussing the increase in fire activity from 2004 to 2008 and 
increasing risk levels in general). 
133. See GAO FOREST SERVICE 2011, supra note 8, at 2. 
134. Federal Land Assistance Management & Enhancement Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 
111-88 § 503, 123 Stat. 2971 (2009). 
135. GAO FOREST SERVICE 2011, supra note 8, at 3. 
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study,136 directed that the Departments of Agriculture and 
Interior needed to develop more “clearly defined cost-
containment goals and objectives,” because without these clear 
standards “federal land and fire managers in the field are more 
likely to select strategies and tactics that favor suppressing 
fires quickly over those that seek to balance the benefits of 
protecting the resources at risk and the costs of protecting 
them.”137 Additionally, FLAME required agencies’ cohesive 
management strategy to improve risk assessment, incorporate 
climate factors and develop cost-effective strategies.138 
In March 2011, the Departments of Agriculture and Interior 
submitted their first National Cohesive Wildland Fire 
Management Strategy to Congress (Cohesive Strategy).139 The 
Cohesive Strategy focuses on three main areas: maintaining 
resilient landscapes, creating fire-adapted communities and 
responding to wildfires.140 Additionally, the Cohesive Strategy 
sets forth a three-phased approach beginning with the 
development of the Cohesive Strategy and the initial Report to 
Congress as required by FLAME, and followed by the 
Development of Regional Strategies and Assessments and 
finally the National Trade-Off Analysis and Execution.141 The 
Agencies indicate that this new Cohesive Strategy, which 
builds on existing fire management policies,142 will set forth a 
vision for the next century to “safely and effectively extinguish 
fire, when needed; use fire where allowable; manage our 
natural resources; and as a Nation, live with wildland fire.”143 
                                                
136. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-655, WILDLAND FIRE 
MANAGEMENT: LACK OF CLEAR GOALS OR A STRATEGY HINDERS FEDERAL AGENCIES’ 
EFFORTS TO CONTAIN THE COSTS OF FIGHTING FIRES (2007). 
137. Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
138. FLAME Act § 503 (“Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of 
this Act, the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture shall submit to 
Congress a report that contains a cohesive wildland fire management strategy.”); see 
also FORESTS AND RANGELANDS, COHESIVE WILDFIRE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 
BRIEFING PAPER (Aug. 6, 2010), available at http:// www.forestsandrangelands.gov. 
139. Letter from Ken Salazar, Secretary, Dep’t of the Interior and Thomas J. 
Vilsack, Secretary, Dep’t of Agric., to the Honorable Senator Jack Reed, Chairman, 
Subcommittee on Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies (Mar. 25, 2011), 
available at http://www.forestsandrangelands.gov/strategy/national.shtml. 
140. Id. 
141. Id; see also A NATIONAL COHESIVE WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, 
supra note 7, at 2. 
142. See discussion infra Part I.B.iv. 
143. A NATIONAL COHESIVE WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 7, 
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This new strategy indicates a shifted focus for the Forest 
Service and other land management agencies towards a more 
balanced approach to fire management and planning. To 
achieve this balance, the Forest Service will need to account 
for existing problems with suppression tactics and the role of 
NEPA.  The careful analysis NEPA requires can inform the 
FLAME Act’s cost-reducing mandate by analyzing the 
effectiveness and long-term ecological effects of suppression 
activities.144 
B. Forest Service Management Practices Do Not Adequately 
Account for the Potential Environmental Harm of Fire 
Suppression 
Fire management can alter the natural role of fire in an 
ecosystem and negatively impact the environment. In the draft 
EIS for the updated national land management plan rule, the 
Forest Service discusses various stressors that threaten, 
degrade, or impair ecological health and biodiversity, including 
fire suppression activities.145 Because land management plans 
play a significant role in fire management,146 this statement 
suggests that the Forest Service recognizes and aims to 
minimize the environmental damage of fire suppression 
efforts. Current Forest Service mitigation strategies, however, 
fall short of reducing the overall environmental impact of fire 
suppression. 
The Forest Service attempts to mitigate environmental 
damage caused by fire suppression by practicing light-handed 
suppression in sensitive areas and rehabilitating areas post-
                                                
at 2. 
144. See GAO WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT 2002, supra note 5, at 4 (indicating the 
Forest Service needs to measure the effectiveness an impact of fire-risk reduction fuel 
treatments to better allocate resources for community and forest protection). 
145. HARRIS SHERMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. FOREST SERVICE, DRAFT 
PROGRAMMATIC ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT: NAT’L FOREST SYSTEM LAND MGMT. 
PLANNING ch. 3, at 62 (2011), available at http://www.fs.usda.gov/planningrule (noting 
that the stress and degree of impact can range “from the permanent impairment of 
severe compaction or erosion on soil productivity to stream sedimentation from a 
temporary road that can be decommissioned and rehabilitated to prescribed burning 
that can be used to replicate historic function of fire on the landscape”). 
146. Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Citizens I), 341 F.3d 961, 
965–66 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the tiered land management system and 
emphasizing that national uniform regulations promulgated by the Secretary of 
Agriculture “govern the development and revision of regional and local plans”). 
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fire.147 For example, in designated wilderness and other 
ecologically sensitive areas, the Forest Service employs 
minimum impact suppression tactics (MIST) to reduce the 
long-term effects caused by suppression.148 MIST guidelines 
include using natural barriers for fire line, using specific fire-
line width and depth, and limiting use of fire retardant.149 The 
Forest Service use of MIST guidelines can reduce the 
environmental harm caused by heavy-handed suppression, but 
the majority of public lands are not sensitive areas and thus do 
not trigger use of these guidelines.150 
To reduce the damage caused by fire and fire suppression, 
the Forest Service employs Burned Area Emergency 
Rehabilitation (BAER) procedures that include native grass 
seeding and surface raking to prevent erosion and flooding 
from fire and fire suppression methods.151 The purpose of these 
treatments is to reduce soil erosion and water runoff, which 
increase the risk of flooding and damage to natural 
resources.152 The effectiveness of these efforts remains 
unclear.153 Additionally, the treatments themselves can spread 
non-native plants and increase erosion and sedimentation.154 
Fire suppression can reduce the natural role of fire in 
maintaining healthy ecosystems, which can result in 
significant ecological damage.155 Near complete fire exclusion 
in Western coniferous forests increased the risk of catastrophic 
wildfires due to the buildup of hazardous fuels in these 
forests.156 The 1995 Betscha Report emphasized that fire 
                                                
147. See Dana M. Backer et al., Impacts of Fire-Suppression Activities on Natural 
Communities, 18 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 937, 938, 940 (2004). 
148. Id. at 937, 938. 
149. See id. at 941, 943. 
150. See id. 
151. Daniel G. Neary et al., Burned Area Emergency Watershed Rehabilitation: 
Program Goals, Techniques, Effectiveness, and Future Directions in the 21st Century, 
RMRS-P-13 ROCKY MOUNTAIN RESEARCH STATION 375, 377 (2000). 
152. See Backer, supra note 147, at 940–41; see also Neary, supra note 151, at 376–
77. 
153. See Neary, supra note 151, at 377. 
154. Backer, supra note 147, at 941 (explaining that rehabilitation treatments can 
spread non-native plants, increase erosion and sedimentation and reduce of habitat). 
155. See U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR ET AL., supra note 48, at 5–6 (noting that decreases 
in wildland fire can destabilize fire-adapted ecosystems and increase understory 
vegetation which can be a hazardous fuel and create more severe fires). 
156. See Jon E. Keely et al., Reexamining Fire Suppression Impacts on Brushland 
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suppression activities should only be conducted when 
necessary for human safety.157 Furthermore, it indicated that 
the practice of pumping surface water from small bodies of 
water is not particularly effective in suppressing fires and  can 
increase the risk of ecological damage to aquatic ecosystems.158 
To prevent this from occurring, the Besctha Report 
recommended that agencies should restrict use of mechanical 
equipment in sensitive and wilderness areas.159 
Similarly, a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service study found that 
use of aerial fire retardant likely causes an “increase in 
invasive species, loss of substantial fraction of population or 
habitat, and harm to soil chemistry and plant physiology,” as 
well as direct mortality to fish and amphibian populations.160 
Aerial fire retardant consists of eighty-five percent water and 
fifteen percent fertilizer, thickeners and corrosion inhibitors.161 
Each year, firefighters drop millions of gallons of this 
substance on the nation’s forests, which may inadvertently 
land on people, on animals and in streams.162 The retardant’s 
effect on streams can be catastrophic and can kill fish, 
including some threatened species.163  For example, in 2001 
                                                
Fire Regimes, 284 SCIENCE 1829, 1829–32 (1999). 
157. See ROBERT L. BESCHTA ET AL., WILDFIRE AND SALVAGE LOGGING 5, 11 (Mar. 
1995) [hereinafter Beschta Report], http://www.saveamericasforests.org/congress/Fire/ 
Beschta-report.htm. The Beschta Report is an independent scientific study that 
questioned about salvage logging in severely burned areas. See Keiter, supra note 6, at 
336. 
158. Beschta Report, supra note 157, at 12. 
159. Id. 
160. Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE III), 726 
F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1226 (D. Mont. 2010). 
161. Id. at 1225. 
162. See id. at 1244–45 (discussing Forest Service guidance on use of aerial fire 
retardants that prohibits drops within 300 feet of streams). 
163. See Restoration Project: Omak Creek, WILD FISH HABITAT INITIATIVE, 
http://wildfish.montana.edu/Cases/browse_details.asp?ProjectID=48 (last updated Apr. 
7, 2007) (According to a study by the Wildfish Habitat Initiative, a cooperative effort 
between US FWS and the Montana Water Center, Omak Creek in Eastern 
Washington State experienced catastrophic environmental harm from fire retardant 
drops. In 1992, the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation began restoring 
Omak Creek to rehabilitate historic steelhead and salmon spawning grounds. The 
project involved removing large boulders and other barriers that tumbled into the 
stream as a result of decades of blasting from mining and expansion projects. In 2001, 
the project experienced a major setback. That summer a wildfire raged on the public 
lands near the creek. Firefighters called for retardant to be dropped to stop the blaze, 
but instead of blanketing the trees, the drop blanketed the fragile creek eventually 
killing a significant amount of the threatened steelhead in the creek. Only two years 
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and 2003, retardant drops landed on a recently rehabilitated 
creek in Eastern Washington, killing a significant population 
of threatened steelhead.164 
Scientific reports suggest that fire suppression tactics can 
damage soils, waterways and vegetation.165 Often, fire 
suppression tactics employ heavy equipment such as tractors, 
bulldozers and wheeled skidders to create containment or fire 
lines or helicopter landing sites.166 Hand crews, usually of 
twenty people, create containment lines by clearing all dead 
fuel from the ground, leaving only mineral soil exposed.167 
These lines present environmental concerns because they 
remove native vegetation and breakup wildlife habitat.168 
Potential impacts from constructing fire-line include erosion, 
spreading invasive species, and polluting of waterways.169 
Ecosystems in extremely dry, wet or cold areas experience 
more significant impacts from fire-suppression.170 For example, 
fire-lines constructed in permafrost may cause melting when 
mineral soil is exposed to sunlight.171 Furthermore, fire 
suppression tactics can impact water quality. Water sources 
near to a fire often become draw points for helibucket drops or 
water pumps, which can impact habitat and increase 
turbidity.172 
Despite their impacts, these suppression efforts are often 
necessary to protect human safety and forest resources.  
Severe fires may cause unacceptable damage, themselves, 
                                                
later, another fire raged in the area, more retardant was inadvertently dropped on the 
creek, and more endangered fish died as a result of the drop.). 
164. Id. 
165. Backer, supra note 147, at 939 (demonstrating the various impacts fire 
suppression can have on land, air and water. Fire camps, fire lines and road 
construction contribute to soil compaction and erosion. Similarly, these activities can 
impact water quality). 
166. Id. at 939. 
167. See Omi, supra note 2, at 204. 
168. JACKIE R. HAFLA ET AL., ENVTL. SURVEILLANCE, EDUC., AND RESEARCH 
PROGRAM, ECOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF FIRE FIGHTING EFFORTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
TWIN BUTTE/MOONSHINER AND HIGHWAY 20 WILDLAND FIRES, November 26, 2008. 1–
2, 11–13 (Nov. 26, 2008), available at http://www.gsseser.com/PDF/FireLineSurvey 
TwinButte.pdf. 
169. Backer, supra note 147, at 940. 
170. Id. at 939–940. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 942. 
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despite their ecological role.173 For example, hot and intense 
wildfires create loss of vegetation that exposes mineral soil and 
causes increased risk of erosion.174 The burning of the organic 
forest floor also impacts the soil’s ability to absorb water, 
increasing the risk of flash floods175 and sediment in 
streams.176 Further, fires can also contribute to loss of forest 
productivity and impact communities.177 While severe fires can 
have detrimental effects on ecosystems, the impact of fire 
suppression methods can, at times, cause even greater harm 
than simply allowing the fire to burn.178 Decisions as to how 
and when to suppress fire should include careful consideration 
of both fire’s beneficial and detrimental impacts, and should 
reflect the true cost of suppression. 
III. CURRENT FOREST SERVICE POLICIES AND NEPA 
REVIEW PRACTICES LIMIT ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
FIRE SUPPRESSION DECISIONS 
On a national level, Forest Service policies and guidelines 
restrict the application of NEPA in land management and fire 
suppression. Under the NFMA, the Forest Service must 
develop national regulations that guide the development of 
LRMPs.179 In accordance with the NFMA, the Forest Service 
first promulgated regulations in 1979, and subsequently 
amended them in 1982, 2000, 2005 and 2008.180 
Environmental groups successfully challenged each of the 
2000, 2005 and 2008 amendments for failure to comply with 
                                                
173. David w. Peterson et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of Seeding and Fertilization 
Treatments for Reducing Erosion Potential Following Severe Wildfires, RMRS-P-46CD 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN RESEARCH CENTER 465 (2007) (investigates the impact of BAER 
post-fire rehabilitation on the Pot-Peak-Sis Ridge wildfire complex of 2004). 
174. Id. 
175. See Neary, supra note 151, at 375. 
176. See Peterson, supra note 173, at 465. 
177. Id. 
178. Backer, supra note 147, at 938. 
179. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Citizens I), 341 F.3d 961, 
965–67 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing the three tiered regulatory system under NFMA 
that requires uniform national regulations of the forest management system to govern 
development and revision of regional and local plans); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g) 
(2006). 
180. See Citizens I 341 F.3d at 966–69; see also Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric. (Citizens III), 632 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972–973, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(striking down the 2008 regulation for failure to comply with NEPA and the ESA). 
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NEPA and the ESA.181 Taken together, this litigation suggests 
Forest Service resistance to NEPA procedures at the planning 
level. In the fire context, this resistance translates to a lack of 
environmental review. 
A. The Forest Service’s 2005 and 2008 Amendments to NFMA 
Regulations Failed to Comply with ESA and NEPA 
Two cases challenging Forest Service amendments to the 
agency’s NFMA land management rules of 2005 and 2008 
found that the Forest Service did not comply with the ESA and 
NEPA in promulgating new regulations under the NFMA.182 In 
Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(Citizens II), several environmental groups challenged the 
2005 Rule to the Forest Service’s national uniform regulations 
for its failure to comply with NEPA and the ESA.183 The 
complaint alleged, in part, that the agency violated NEPA by 
not performing an EIS or EA on the proposed amendments.184 
In response to this claim, the Forest Service argued that NEPA 
did not apply to the 2005 Rule because it would impact land 
management plans that were “strategic and aspirational in 
nature,” which did not “include decisions with on-the-ground 
effects that can be meaningfully evaluated.”185 Thus, the 
Forest Service argued that a categorical exemption applied 
because the 2005 Rule, as a planning document, was unlikely 
to have a significant and real environmental impact.186   
The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
California (Northern District of California) rejected the 
application of the categorical exclusion187 and ordered the 
Forest Service to conduct a programmatic EA on the 2005 
Rule.188 The court enjoined the use of the 2005 Rule until the 
                                                
181. See Citizens I, 341 F.3d at 961; see also Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Agric. (Citizens II), 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2007); Citizens III, 632 F. 
Supp. 2d 968. 
182. Citizens II, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059; Citizens III, 632 F. Supp. 2d 968 (challenging 
the 2008 regulation). 
183. See Citizens II, 481 F. Supp. 2d at 1067. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. (quoting 70 Fed. Reg. at 1031–32). 
186. Id. at 1067–68. 
187. Id. at 1087. 
188. Id. at 1090, 1085–86 (noting that several Ninth Circuit decisions recognize the 
need for programmatic EISs). 
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Forest Service complied with NEPA.189 In response to this 
ruling, the USDA and the Forest Service attempted to comply 
with the court’s decision by promulgating the 2008 
amendments.190 To create the 2008 Amended Rule, the Forest 
Service conducted an EIS on the 2005 Rule and accepted public 
comments.191 During the process, the Forest Service stressed 
that the 2008 Rule had no direct or indirect environmental 
impact because it merely outlined procedures for developing 
LRMPs and thus, was not connected to a specific, foreseeable 
action that could impact the environment.192 
In 2009, the Citizens for Better Forestry challenged the 2008 
Rule alleging the EIS performed on the 2008 Rule merely 
reiterated earlier findings and did not consider the effects of 
eliminating certain environmental protection requirements 
that were found in the 2000 Rule.193 The Northern District of 
California held that the 2008 Rule violated NEPA because the 
EIS merely insisted that no environmental effect would occur 
from the Rule, but failed to consider its actual environmental 
impact.194 Based on this finding the court enjoined the use of 
the 2008 Rule and directed the agency to return to the most 
recent workable rule.195 As a result, the Forest Service 
returned to the 2000 rules, and is currently working to develop 
new rules that comply with NFMA and other environmental 
laws.196 These legal challenges to Forest Service land 
management plan regulations suggest a broader problem with 
the agency’s willingness to adequately apply NEPA, including 
to its fire suppression activities. Put another way, the Forest 
Service’s resistance to NEPA procedures for its planning 
decisions negates the law’s important role of ensuring agency 
decisions account for potential environmental impacts. 
In response to this litigation, the Forest Service released a 
                                                
189. Id. at 1097, 1100. 
190. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Citizens III), 632 F. 
Supp. 2d 968, 973, 981 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. at 980. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. National Forest System Land Management Planning, 76 Fed. Reg. 30, 8482 
(Feb. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R pt. 219) (discussing promulgation of the 2011 
rule). 
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proposed land management rule in February 2011.197 As the 
Forest Service works towards a new final rule, it will be 
important for the agency to emphasize NEPA’s role as an 
important planning tool, especially for fire management. 
B. Forest Service NEPA Policies Allow Fire Suppression to 
Circumvent NEPA Review 
The Forest Service’s reluctance to employ NEPA at the 
planning level extends to fire management where many fire 
suppression activities fall under emergency exemptions from 
NEPA.198 
In 2008, the Forest Service codified its NEPA policy, 
previously found in its Forest Service Manual and Forest 
Service Handbook, and clarified the role of the CEQ guidance 
as it applies to Forest Service NEPA implementation.199 In 
codifying the rule, the Forest Service indicated its intent to 
increase the visibility of its NEPA procedures and to promote 
“the transparent nature of the Forest Service’s environmental 
analysis and decision making.”200 
At the same time, the Forest Service provided exemptions 
for certain emergency situations in which the agency felt that 
applying traditional NEPA procedures would be impossible.201 
For a situation to be considered an emergency and exempt 
from NEPA procedures under the regulations, the emergency 
action must be “necessary to control the immediate impacts of 
the emergency and are urgently needed to mitigate harm to 
life, property, or important natural or cultural resources.”202 
While the rule requires agency officials to account for and 
mitigate foreseeable environmental consequences of this 
action,203 it does not impose a full NEPA review process. While 
it is true that many emergency situations do not allow time for 
implementing the NEPA processes, the emergency exception 
allows fire suppression activities to continually evade NEPA 
                                                
197. Id. 
198. 40 C.F.R. § 220.4 (2008). 
199. See generally id. 
200. Id. 
201. Id. 
202. Id. § 220.4(b)(1). 
203. Id. 
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review.204 Though some situations require emergency 
procedures, fire suppression should not be categorically labeled 
as emergency for the purpose of NEPA. For example, once a 
wildfire ignites, the agency must quickly determine the best 
approach to manage or suppress the fire.  However, if the 
Forest Service previously conducted either a programmatic or 
site-specific NEPA review on the environmental impact of 
different suppression tactics then this environmental impact 
information could inform decisions once fires ignite.205 
To some extent, the Forest Service recognizes the need for 
environmental and risk analysis during active fire suppression 
and requires a Resource Advisor to identify and evaluate 
potential impacts and benefits of fire operations on natural 
and cultural resources.206 In some fire situations, a Resource 
Advisor counsels the Incident Commander (IC), the person in 
charge of tactical fire-suppression decisions, about anticipated 
impacts of fire operations on natural resources and protection 
requirements that should be followed.207 The Resource 
Advisor’s (RA) responsibilities extend to analyzing and 
advising the IC on various issues, including special status 
species and fisheries and special management areas, such as 
wilderness and conservation areas.208 While the RA plays an 
important role in monitoring ecological health during fire 
suppression, the Forest Service recommends but does not 
require RAs to attend training in NEPA screening 
procedures.209 The optional nature of this training for the 
person charged with monitoring the ecological health of forests 
suggests the Forest Service does not consider NEPA a key 
player in fire suppression. 
When these fire suppression policies are viewed alongside 
the Forest Service’s failure to comply with NEPA in 
promulgating land management program rules, the two 
suggest that the agency should reevaluate its NEPA policies in 
the broader land management context, and more specifically in 
                                                
204. See Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE I), 
397 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1252 (D. Mont. 2005). 
205. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council et al., 490 U.S. 332, 349 
(1989) (discussing NEPA’s role in more informed decisionmaking). 
206. RA GUIDE, supra note 1, at 1. 
207. See REDBOOK, supra note 4, at 11–17. 
208. Id. 
209. RA GUIDE, supra note 1, at 14. 
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its fire suppression activities. Recent federal case law supports 
this argument and indicates that Forest Service fire 
suppression activities are vulnerable to NEPA challenges.210 
IV. SEVERAL FEDERAL COURTS RECOGNIZE THE 
NEED FOR FOREST SERVICE ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
FIRE SUPPRESSION 
Recent federal court decisions indicate that Forest Service 
environmental review of its suppression efforts falls short of 
the legal requirements.211 Prior to these recent decisions, most 
of the legal challenges to Forest Service fire policy involved 
NEPA, NFMA and ESA claims that aimed to enjoin either 
prescribed burns intended to reduce fire danger or post-fire 
burned timber salvage harvests. 212 While these suits address 
important pre- and post-fire environmental concerns, Forest 
Service Employees for Environmental Ethics v. U.S. Forest 
Service represents a shift towards expanding the NEPA 
framework to embrace fire suppression tactics. 
A. The Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics 
Decisions Requires the Forest Service be Accountable for 
Its Fire Suppression Choices 
In Forest Service Employees for Environmental Ethics v. 
U.S. Forest Service (FSEEE I) the Forest Service Employees 
for Environmental Ethics (FSEEE) initiated a suit in the 
United States District Court for the District of Montana 
(District Court of Montana), alleging that the Forest Service 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously when it failed to conduct 
NEPA environmental reviews for its use of aerial fire 
retardant.213 In 2005, the District Court found the Forest 
Service violated NEPA by failing to prepare either an EA or an 
EIS for the aerial retardant use.214 Emphasizing that the 
Forest Service cannot narrowly construe statutes to avoid 
                                                
210. See discussion infra Part IV.A and B. 
211. See e.g. Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE 
III), 726 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1218 (D. Mont. 2010); Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. 
Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE I), 397 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (D. Mont. 2005). 
212. See e.g. League of Wilderness Defenders v. Allen, 615 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). 
213. FSEEE I, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1246. 
214. Id. at 1247. 
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compliance, the court explained that the Forest Service had a 
duty to comply with NEPA when “substantial questions are 
raised as to whether a project may have a significant effect.”215 
Because the court found that the “annual dumping of millions 
of gallons of chemical fire retardant on national forests” raised 
these substantial questions, the court ordered the Forest 
Service to comply with NEPA.216 
The importance of this decision is three-fold. First, and most 
importantly, the decision recognizes that the emergency 
nature of fire suppression makes it impracticable to conduct 
case-by-case NEPA reviews, but mandates NEPA compliance 
before a fire ignites to evaluate the impact of individual 
suppression tactics.217 Second, the court emphasizes NEPA’s 
principle that significant environmental impacts need only be 
likely to result from the action, not guaranteed.218 Finally, the 
decision recognizes the cumulative environmental effect of 
multiple annual fire suppression actions.219 Thus, the decision 
stands for the principle that when the impacts of fire 
suppression tactics raise substantial questions about 
environmental impac, either immediately or over time, then 
the Forest Service should apply NEPA to those tactics prior to 
emergency suppression efforts. 
Addressing the need for programmatic review of fire 
suppression tactics, the court noted that Supreme Court 
precedent220 recommends “case-by-case” review of agency 
                                                
215. Id. (quoting Blue Mountain Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 
1212 (9th Cir. 1998) (cert. denied by Malheur Lumber Co v. Blue Mountains 
Biodiversity Project, 527 U.S. 1003 (1999)). 
216. Id. at 1254. 
217. Id. at 1250 (“[I]t is impossible to do an EIS between the time that the person in 
charge of a particular fire-fighting operation orders the use of chemical fire retardant 
and the actual use of it.”). 
218. Id. at 1254 (“To show that the agency violated its duty to prepare an EIS . . . a 
plaintiff need not show that a significant effect will in fact occur, only that substantial 
questions are raised as to whether a project may have a significant impact.” (emphasis 
in original)). 
219. Id. (recognizing that the annual dumping of fire retardant, as well as site-
specific applications of retardant, could have a significant effect). 
220. See id. at 1249–1252. The court distinguishes Lujan v. National Wildlife 
Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (requiring plaintiffs to challenge particular agency 
actions that cause harm as opposed to programmatic NEPA review of a land 
withdrawal review program) and Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
(SUWA), 542 U.S. 55 (1990) (finding APA challenges require plaintiffs to assert the 
agency failed to take a discrete, required agency action) because the Forest Service’s 
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actions, but distinguished fire suppression activities from 
other, less time-sensitive agency activities because fire 
suppression requires fast-paced decisions under intense 
conditions.221 The court rejected the Forest Service argument 
in favor of case-by-case NEPA reviews222 because “it is 
impossible to do an EIS between the time the person in charge 
of a particular fire-fighting operation orders the use of 
chemical fire retardant and the actual use of the retardant.”223 
In making this observation, the court conceded the 
impracticability of conducting site-specific, case-by-case NEPA 
review before each decision to use aerial fire retardant. 
Further, the court highlighted numerous Forest Service 
documents and policies, including a nationwide contract for 
retardant and long-time use of chemical fire retardant that 
demonstrated agency action occurred prior to the actual 
application of aerial fire retardant.224 
The court’s reasoning applies to any decisions made by on-
the-ground personnel during fire suppression activities 
because firefighters constantly face immediacy concerns.225 
That is, it is virtually impossible for firefighting officials to 
conduct any environmental review before initiating fire 
suppression.226 FMPs provide the basis for many of the on-the-
ground decisions, but as discussed infra Part I.B.iii, the Forest 
Service does not consider fire management plans “decisional 
documents” that are subject to NEPA review.227 As the FSEEE 
I court notes, failure to conduct programmatic EISs on a fire 
suppression tactic means that the tactic “will completely evade 
NEPA because it would be impossible to consult NEPA after a 
                                                
decision to allow fire retardant use has a direct and immediate impact on the 
environment and, without a programmatic EIS the use of fire retardant would evade 
review. 
221. Id. at 1250 (“In most situations time is not of the essence and the law generally 
requires a site specific plan before NEPA compliance is required.”). 
222. See id. (The Forest Service argued that agency action did not occur until the on-
site decision to use fire retardant). 
223. Id. at 1250. 
224. Id. 
225. REDBOOK, supra note 4, at 1–7 (“While the magnitude and complexity of the fire 
itself and of the human response to it will vary, the fact that fire operations are 
inherently dangerous will never change.”). 
226. FSEEE I, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1250. 
227. See id. 
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site-specific action is proposed and approved.”228 Allowing such 
a reading of NEPA “does not comport with the goals of NEPA 
and would allow federal agencies to evade NEPA by allowing 
final decisions to be made ‘on the ground’ by local officials.”229 
Based on the FSEEE I holding, the Forest Service initiated 
an Environmental Assessment (EA) of its use of chemical 
aerial fire retardant to fight fire.230 After the Forest Service 
considered two alternatives, no action and the proposed action 
(use of fire retardant), the Forest Service issued a Finding of 
No Significant Impact (FONSI), allowing the agency to 
continue its retardant use without conducting the more in-
depth EIS.231 In 2010, FSEEE challenged232 this EA and the 
Forest Service’s conclusion that use of aerial fire retardant 
results in no significant impact. First, FSEEE contended that 
the scope of the Forest Service’s EA on aerial fire retardant 
was too narrow because it failed to include indirect effects and 
cumulative impacts of other fire suppression tactics.233 Second, 
FSEEE argued that the Forest Service’s EA was inadequate 
because it did not thoroughly analyze effects on fish and 
plants, nor did it adequately explore alternatives.234 Third, 
FSEEE challenged the Forest Service decision not to prepare 
an EIS.235 
The court rejected the first claim, finding that the Forest 
Service was not required to evaluate the agency’s entire fire 
suppression practices as either indirect or cumulative effects. 
The court found that evidence did not supported FSEEE’s 
argument that aerial fire retardant caused harm by altering 
natural fire regimes and that other fire suppression tactics 
were not connected actions to the use of fire retardant.236 That 
is, the use of fire retardant did not necessitate the use of other 
                                                
228. Id. at 1252. 
229. Id. 
230. See Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE III), 
726 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1205 (D. Mont. 2010). 
231. See id. at 1205–1206. 
232. FSEEE also brought ESA claims against the Forest Service and the Fish and 
Wildlife Service. 
233. See FSEEE III, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 1208–1210. 
234. See id. at 1211. 
235. See id. at 1214. 
236. See id. at 1209–1212. 
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fire suppression tactics.237 The court also rejected the second 
claim, finding that while brief, the discussion of effects on 
plants and fish from continued aerial retardant use met the 
EA standards.238 On the third claim, however, the court found 
that the Forest Service must perform an EIS for the use of 
aerial retardant because the ESA jeopardy findings indicated 
aerial fire retardant could create significant impacts, but failed 
to place any restrictions on retardant use. 239 Thus, the Forest 
Service relied on insufficient determinations of the FWS and 
NOAA Fisheries when it should have made its own 
determinations under an EIS.240 
This decision narrows the application of FSEEE I by finding 
that the Forest Service was not required to evaluate the 
cumulative environmental impacts of all its suppression tactics 
combined, but retains the FSEEE I holding that NEPA applies 
to individual fire suppression tactics.241 Despite this narrower 
application, FSEEE III upholds the application of NEPA to 
suppression tactics on an individual basis. That is, where an 
individual suppression tactic, such as the use of bulldozers, 
has a significant impact on the environment and evidence 
suggests agency action on a broader level, the Forest Service 
should initiate NEPA review on that suppression tactic. This 
conclusion is further supported by other federal court decisions 
that recognize that some suppression activities can have 
adverse environmental impacts. 
B. Other Federal District Courts Recognized Potential 
Adverse Impacts From Fire Suppression 
Two federal courts, the United States District Court for the 
District of Oregon (District Court of Oregon) and the District 
Court of Northern California, recently recognized that certain 
fire suppression actions may cause adverse environmental 
effects that should be considered cumulative effects during 
salvaging projects.242 While these two courts considered 
                                                
237. See id. 
238. See id. at 1212–1214. 
239. See id. at 1218. 
240. See id. 
241. See id. at 1209–1212. 
242. See League of Wilderness Defenders v. Marquis-Brong, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1115 
(D.Or. 2003); League of Wilderness Defenders-Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. 
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slightly different legal questions than District Court of 
Montana in the FSEEE cases, they too indicate that fire 
suppression tactics require NEPA environmental review. 
In League of Wilderness Defenders v. Marquis-Brong243 the 
District Court of Oregon held that the Bureau of Land 
Management’s use of a pre-fire EA for logging in a certain area 
was inadequate because it failed to consider the impact of fire 
suppression as part of analyzing the cumulative impacts of 
salvage logging in a burned area.244 These fire suppression 
activities included aerial retardant drops and two miles of 
road-building in riparian areas.245 The court noted that while 
certain activities may not individually create a significant 
impact, the cumulative effects of related activities (e.g. fire 
suppression and timber salvaging) should be considered 
together in an EIS.246 
In League of Wilderness Defenders–Blue Mountain 
Biodiversity Project v. Forsgren,247 the court considered a 
similar issue and found the Forest Service EA on a timber-
salvaging project inadequate. The EA had failed to consider 
the cumulative impacts to soils from previous fire and fire 
suppression tactics that include fire-fighters’ use of chemical 
fire retardants and construction of miles of bulldozer lines.248 
The court did not decide whether these impacts had individual 
significance, but determined that the Forest Service should 
have considered the impact of these events in the prepared 
EA.249 
Unlike in FSEEE I and III, which considered use of 
suppression tactics during an active fire, these courts 
considered whether the federal agencies sufficiently followed 
NEPA in post-burn timber salvaging. Due to the scope of this 
question, the courts’ considerations of fire suppression impacts 
were relatively cursory. Yet, these two decisions demonstrate 
                                                
Forsgren, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D.Or. 2002). 
243. Marquis-Brong, 259 F. Supp. 2d 1115. 
244. Id. at 1124. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Forsgren, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1058. 
248. Id. at 1070; see also Sierra Club v. Bosworth, 199 F. Supp. 2d 971, 985–987 
(N.D.Cal. 2002). 
249. Forsgren, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 1070. 
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judicial recognition of fire suppression’s environmental 
impacts, especially when combined with other forest 
management activities. In short, these federal district court 
cases collectively demonstrate that impacts of fire suppression 
activities, especially use of chemical fire retardant and heavy 
equipment, may cause significant impact on the environment, 
which imposes a legal duty on the Forest Service to adequately 
consider these impacts prior to fire suppression.250 
V. FOREST SERVICE SHOULD REVISE ITS POLICIES TO 
INCREASE FIRE SUPPRESSION ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
The emergency nature of fire should not prevent the Forest 
Service, or other agencies, from evaluating the environmental 
impacts of fire suppression tactics. While the fast-paced, 
emergency aspect of fires hinders the agency’s ability to 
conduct site-specific on-the-ground NEPA evaluations, this 
emergency response should not prevent the Forest Service 
from conducting an EA or EIS ahead of the blaze. Fire is a 
reality of western American summers, and while its exact 
time, place and intensity may be unpredictable, enough factors 
are certain251 to adequately prepare agency officials making 
decisions on the ground. 
Two key questions confront Forest Service wildland fire 
suppression: (1) whether or not fire should be suppressed and 
(2) if it should be suppressed, what suppression methods best 
conform with the Forest Service’s dual role of managing the 
forests and protecting people. Answering these questions 
requires careful consideration of environmental impacts and 
human risks,252 and these considerations cannot be adequately 
performed during emergency fire suppression activities.253 
                                                
250. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006) (discussing the procedures required for “major 
federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment”). 
251. See e.g., REDBOOK, supra note 4, at 1-7 (discussing the need for fire 
preparedness through planning and implementing programs and developing 
infrastructure prior to fire ignitions, which includes “pre-positioning and deploying 
firefighters and equipment”). 
252. See A NATIONAL COHESIVE WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 
7, at 2. 
253. See Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE I), 
397 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1252 (D. Mont. 2005) (discussing the impossibility of NEPA 
review during the application of a site-specific fire suppression tactic). 
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Rather, these questions must be analyzed before emergency 
fire situations in order for Forest Service fire officials to make 
better on-the-ground decisions. Using legal protections and 
scientific evidence to determine the best practices of fire 
suppression will create better fire management by considering 
all the relevant factors while maintaining an emphasis on 
human safety.254 Ideally, careful analysis of fire suppression 
tactics and their consequences will not only increase 
environmental considerations, but also enhance safety for 
people and property. 
NEPA and Forest Service guidance already provide the 
framework for this informed decision-making. Further, the 
Forest Service and other land management agencies recognize 
the need for a more comprehensive, thoughtful approach to fire 
management by emphasizing the need for overarching goals 
and performance measures to govern regional decisions.255 
Information developed through environmental assessments 
and environmental impact statements under NEPA can 
support and inform these goals and performance measures by 
providing valuable information on impacts to the 
environmental landscape. Likewise, the NEPA process will 
allow for an evaluation of costs that includes both ecological 
and economic impacts. Such measured analysis of the costs 
and impacts of fire comports with the philosophies that the 
Forest Service lists as its “Guiding Principles” in fire 
suppression.256 
A. The Forest Service Should Require Programmatic NEPA 
Review for Specific Suppression Tactics 
Given the judicial and scientific recognition that fire 
suppression tactics may cause significant individual or 
cumulative environmental impacts,257 the Forest Service 
should conduct programmatic environmental analysis of, and 
                                                
254. See REDBOOK, supra note 4, at 1-1 (“Firefighter and public safety is the first 
priority in ever fire management activity.”). 
255. A NATIONAL COHESIVE WILDLAND FIRE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, supra note 7, 
at 7. 
256. Id. at 1-1, 1-2 (indicating that fire management should carefully analyze the 
risks, costs, and ecological impacts of fire). 
257. See e.g., League of Wilderness Defenders-Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project 
v. Forsgren, 184 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (D.Or. 2002). 
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potentially prepare an environmental impact statement, on its 
suppression tactics.258 Applying these more extensive reviews 
to the Forest Service’s fire suppression tactics will likely 
increase agency accountability and reduce the adverse 
environmental impacts caused by some suppression tactics by 
providing fire management decision-makers with more 
information.259 NEPA review can increase agency 
accountability by providing for public notice and comment to 
ensure that the Forest Service makes informed decisions and 
appropriately balances ecological, economic and human costs of 
fire suppression.260 In other words, analyzing the 
environmental impacts before fire ignition allows agencies to 
weigh the environmental costs and safety risks of different 
suppression tactics so that agencies make the best decision for 
both safety and the environment. Programmatic analysis can 
help ensure that the immediate response to fires is also the 
ecologically sound response. 
Some may argue that applying NEPA to suppression tactics 
will reduce safety and increase costs by allowing 
environmentalist groups to sue to enjoin the use of suppression 
tactics. This argument fails to note two important facts. First, 
in the FSEEE litigation, the court did not enjoin the use of the 
retardant, but allowed the Forest Service to continue its use as 
long as it began complying with NEPA and ESA procedures.261 
The court’s decision recognizes the importance of firefighting 
suppression tools in protecting forests, property and people, 
and indicates that the aim of the litigation was to require 
careful analysis of fire suppression tactics and not to inhibit 
the use of potentially life-saving suppression tactics. That is, 
requiring NEPA analysis for fire suppression activities ensures 
careful balancing of all the risks of a tactic and a conscious 
                                                
258. See Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (Citizens II), 481 F. Supp. 
2d 1059, 1085–1086  (N.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing the need for programmatic EISs for 
land management plans). 
259. See Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE I), 
397 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1252 (D. Mont. 2005) (indicating that the decision to apply a fire 
suppression tactic can have “a direct immediate effect on the environment.”). 
260. See id. at 1249 (stating that environmental harm occurs “when governmental 
decisionmakers make up their minds without having before them an analysis (with 
public comment) of the likely effects of their decision on the environment.” (quoting 
Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 341 F.3d 961, 971 (9th Cir. 2003)). 
261. Cf. Forest Serv. Employees for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv. (FSEEE III), 
726 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1232 (D. Mont. 2010). 
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choice between these potential risks; not the all-out ban of 
potentially necessary suppression tactics. Second, fire 
suppression costs are astronomically high and suits to ensure 
more reasoned Forest Service decisions on when and how it 
chooses to suppress wildfires could—if the Forest Service 
complies—save money in the long run. 262 
B. The Forest Service Should Revise Its Fire Suppression 
Guidance And Manuals To Integrate NEPA Review More 
Efficiently And Effectively 
Because Forest Service manuals and guidance inform fire 
officials’ on-the-ground decisions,263 the agency should revise 
these documents to integrate environmental considerations 
analyzed during the NEPA process. Integrating this 
information will allow agency officials making on-the-ground 
fire suppression decisions to consider all the necessary 
environmental risks, along with the potential human and 
property risks. Because interagency guidance already requires 
fire programs to be based on “the best available science”264 
integrating this information should not be too onerous for the 
agency. Indeed, providing this information comports with key 
elements of Wildfire Management Policy, including sustaining 
ecosystems, integrating fire into land management and 
educating firefighters on wildland fire management policies.265 
Providing guidance on the impact of fire suppression should 
not be viewed as placing environmental concerns above the 
safety of fire fighters and communities. Instead, agency 
officials and firefighters should view this information as 
another way to enhance fire suppression by increasing agency 
                                                
262. FSEEE I and FSEEE II provide excellent examples of the agency itself running 
up costs by frustrating the court, failing to provide information to other agencies, and 
resisting compliance with environmental laws. While this may be an isolated 
incidence, the Forest Service resisted complying with the Montana District Court’s 
mandate to take action until the plaintiffs filed for a contempt hearing. See FSEEE III, 
726 F. Supp. 2d at 1201 (denying the motion for contempt after the Forest Service 
complied with the 2005 mandate, noting that contempt could not be used for punitive 
reasons). 
263. FSEEE I, 397 F. Supp. 2d at 1244 (stating that Forest Service guidelines and 
policies “provide guidance on how to respond to fires once they occur and what tools 
are available to respond to wildfire”). 
264. REDBOOK, supra note 207, at 1-4. 
265. Id. at 2–4. 
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accountability and requiring the Forest Service to carefully 
analyze all of the relevant information before making 
important fire suppression decisions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Wildfires are a reality that is unlikely to fade. These fires 
can imperil lives and communities and this danger triggers 
Forest Service emergency suppression actions. Emergency 
suppression actions, while necessary, need not be conducted at 
the expense of forest health. Indeed, mechanisms exist that 
can inform Forest Service suppression actions and increase 
accountability so that agency suppression decisions adequately 
account for ecological concerns. Conducting NEPA review for 
individual suppression tactics that likely cause environmental 
harm will provide this information and allow the information 
to be used during on-the-ground emergency situations. 
Environmental concerns should not trump human safety. 
Ecological health and long-term sustainability should be 
considered in all suppression decisions. 
The FSEEE decisions recognize the importance of 
evaluating the impact of these government actions so that the 
Forest Service can make better choices for communities and 
forests. By definition, emergency decision-making cannot 
thoroughly consider all of the relevant factors because 
decisions must be made quickly to ensure safety. Thus, pre-
emergency planning can provide the necessary information 
about environmental impacts of various suppression tactics. 
The Forest Service has a responsibility to manage the 
forests and its fire suppression activities in a way that ensures 
forest health. While increased NEPA requirements do place a 
heavier burden on fire officials, the law represents Congress’ 
intent and should be incorporated into the agency’s fire 
suppression responsibilities. Moreover, our forests are an 
increasingly delicate resource that must be carefully managed 
to prevent extensive damage to these resources. In the end, a 
balance must be struck between protecting forests and 
suppressing wildfires. These goals are not mutually exclusive 
and can be satisfied through the thoughtful application of 
NEPA’s procedures. 
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